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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies, using firm
level data from the Swiss Business Census and the Dun & Bradstreet exit database
for Switzerland (1995-2000). Employing duration analysis, we find considerable
diﬀerences in the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies, in particular with
respect to firm size, location and the impact of macroeconomic conditions. Our
results support the notion that mergers are often undertaken to seize growth op-
portunities.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly accepted that there are essentially three modes of firm exit: (i) bank-
ruptcy, (ii) voluntary liquidation, and (iii) merger. Furthermore, it is fairly natural to
view both bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation as varieties of firm failure.1 The role
of mergers, however, is less clear. In a controversial discussion of U.S. antitrust policy,
Dewey (1961, 257) stated that “most mergers [...] are merely a civilized alternative
to bankruptcy or the voluntary liquidation that transfers assets from falling to rising
firms.” More recent work suggests, however, that there are important economic diﬀer-
ences between mergers and other modes of exit (see, e.g., Peel and Wilson 1989, Schary
1991, Audretsch 1995, Caves 1998, Harhoﬀ et al. 1998, Wheelstock and Wilson 2000).
Yet, due to data limitations, empirical studies have rarely been able to make a clear
distinction between diﬀerent exit modes.
In fact, we are aware of only two recent contributions that have explicitly distin-
guished exit modes. Harhoﬀ et al. (1998) focus on voluntary liquidations and bankrupt-
cies. These authors find that the larger the firm the smaller the probability of voluntary
liquidation. Interestingly, firm size plays a more subtle role for bankruptcies: Here, the
authors note that size has a positive marginal eﬀect on the probability of bankruptcy
for small firms (less than 18 employees) and a negative eﬀect for larger firms. Wheelock
and Wilson (2000) analyze the determinants of failures and acquisitions in the U.S.
banking industry.2 They find that productive ineﬃciency increases the risk of failure
while reducing the probability of a bank’s being acquired.
Related work by Sorensen (2000) has attempted to identify the characteristics of
merging U.S. firms using financial data. He finds that mergers are primarily undertaken
by firms with above average margins attempting to rapidly increase sales. Andrade et
al. (2002, 103), in turn, argue in a recent survey that most of the reasons for mergers
provided by economic theory–such as eﬃciency-related reasons, attempts to increase
market power, market discipline, agency costs, or diversification–are “relevant to a com-
prehensive understanding of what drives acquisitions”. This suggests that the principal
drivers of mergers and acquisitions are unlikely to be the same as those of bankruptcies
or voluntary liquidations. Yet, there is very little evidence on the diﬀerences in the
determinants of mergers and other modes of firm exit.
1Note, however, that the voluntary liquidation of a venture capital firm may indicate that its business
is expected to be successful after being taken over by a larger established company.
2These authors use the terms acquisitions and mergers interchangeably. In principle, this may be
problematic, as the acquisition of a firm is often equivalent to the voluntary liquidation of that same
firm, so that the events of failure and acquisition are not necessarily mutually exclusive. We shall use
a more narrow definition of mergers below (see section 2).
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In the present paper, we attempt to fill part of this gap by analyzing a novel dataset
that has only recently become available. This dataset on the exit behavior of firms reg-
istered in Switzerland allows us to distinguish diﬀerent exit modes, in particular mergers
and bankruptcies. Employing duration analysis, we find considerable diﬀerences in the
determinants of mergers and bankruptcies. These concern firm- and industry-specific
characteristics as well as the impact of macroeconomic conditions on firm survival. Our
findings support the notion that mergers are often undertaken to seize growth opportu-
nities.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes our
dataset and the hazard models used for determining the principal drivers of mergers and
bankruptcies. Section 3 discusses the results, and section 4 concludes.
2 Data and Models Estimated
To construct our firm level database on the drivers of exit, we merged the following
databases: (i) The Swiss Business Census (SBC 95) compiled by the Swiss Federal Sta-
tistical Oﬃce, which is a full inventory count of all firms with more than 20 weekly
aggregate working hours existing in September 1995 (excluding the agricultural sec-
tor); (ii) the Dun & Bradstreet Exit database (DBED), which covers the exits of firms
listed in the commercial register from January 1994 to December 2000 and distinguishes
between bankruptcies, voluntary liquidations, and mergers. It is important to note
that–following oﬃcial administrative practice–a transaction is coded as a merger in
the DBED if and only if a new firm was founded and both former firms were deleted
from the commercial register. That is, acquisitions (or “asymmetric” mergers)–where
only one of the firms was deleted from the commercial register–are coded as voluntary
liquidations. As a consequence, the DBED does not allow us to disentangle acquisitions
and voluntary liquidations. We therefore focus on the comparison of bankruptcies and
mergers, where the latter are narrowly defined as described above.3
Our database contained 276,123 firms after excluding all firms that were non-profit
oriented according to their legal status (such as cooperatives, associations and clubs,
foundations, churches, embassies and international organizations). Since, according to
Swiss law, only corporations can take part in a merger transaction, we further eliminated
all firms legally classified as partnerships. We also dropped all firms established prior
to 1970, since no information on their founding dates was available. After making these
adjustments, our sample still includes more than 54,000 corporations, from all industries
3In Buehler et al. (2004), we study the determinants of the aggregate of all three exit modes (including
voluntary liquidations).
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represented in Switzerland (excluding agriculture), in all sizes, and ages up to 25 years.
The merged database covers an observation period fromOctober 1995 to December 2000.
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables used below.4
<Table 1 around here>
To model the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies, we first adopt a semi-
parametric approach. More specifically, we employ the Cox proportional hazard model
with time-varying covariates,
hi(t|xi(t)) = h0(t) exp(xi(t)β), (1)
where hi is the hazard function of firm i, h0 is an unspecified “baseline hazard”, and
exp(xi(t)β) is the systematic part of the hazard function, with xi(t) denoting the row
vector of firm i’s covariates xij, j = 1, ..., p, and β denoting the coeﬃcient vector. This
allows us to assess the eﬀect of (changing) covariates on hazard rates without having
to impose a particular shape for the baseline hazard (see, e.g., Therneau and Grambsch
2000).
Second, we study a family of parametric models that explicitly specify the baseline
hazard h0 to assess how the hazard function varies over firm age. These (so-called
“Accelerated Failure Time”) models have in common that the natural logarithm of
survival duration, lnTi, can be expressed as a linear function of the covariates xi(t),
lnTi = xi(t)β+i, (2)
where i is the error with a prespecified distribution that determines the regression
model. Clearly, the choice of a specific distribution is somewhat arbitrary when the true
distribution is unknown. In the next section, we therefore report the estimated hazard
functions for various commonly used distributions and discuss to what extent they diﬀer.
3 Results
3.1 Firm Size and Other Determinants
Table 2 presents our results from estimating the Cox proportional hazards model given
in (1) for mergers and bankruptcies.5 To interpret these results, observe that we do
4See Buehler et al. (2004) for a more detailed description of the database.
5Note that we allow for competing risks in the sense that each firm in the sample (that does not
survive) may only either fail or merge. Once it has exited by one of these modes, another type of exit
is no longer possible. Due to protection of data privacy, we only know whether (and at which point in
time) a firm was involved in a merger; the identity of the other firm(s) involved in the merger remains
unknown.
4
not report the estimated coeﬃcients bβj of covariates xij, j = 1, ..., p, but the estimated
hazard ratios
bHj = bh(t|xj = x0j(t) + 1,x−j(t))bh(t|xj = x0j(t),x−j(t)) = exp(bβj), j = 1, ..., p,
where x−j(t) = (x1(t), ..., xj−1(t), xj+1(t), ..., xp(t)) . The hazard ratio is the factor by
which the hazard function is multiplied if the covariate xj increases by one unit. That
is, if bHj = 1, the hazard rate does not change in response to a change in covariate j,
whereas the hazard increases (decreases) if bHj > 1 ( bHj < 1, respectively). We now
briefly discuss the major diﬀerences in the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies.
<Table 2 around here>
Size. For both mergers and bankruptcies, there is an inverted ∪-shaped relation
between firm size and hazard rate. Yet, the squared term is significant only for bank-
ruptcies, and the estimated coeﬃcients indicate important diﬀerences in the way firm
size aﬀects merger and bankruptcy hazards. Figure 1, which plots the total eﬀect of
firm size on the hazard for bankruptcy and merger (calculated as the combined hazard
ratio of the linear and the quadratic term6) against the size of the firm (the number
of employees), serves to illustrate this: The impact of firm size on bankruptcy reaches
its maximum for very small firms (3 employees) and then decreases monotonically.7 In
marked contrast, the merger probability increases monotonically up to a firm size that
is beyond the largest firm in our sample.8 That is, large firms are less likely to fail than
small firms, but they are more likely to merge.
Industry. It is well-known that, depending on product life-cycles, demand shocks,
etc., failure rates vary considerably across industries. In this study, we consider the
following one-digit industry sectors: (i) manufacturing, (ii) construction, (iii) trade, and
(iv) services. We use manufacturing as the reference sector. It is striking that bankruptcy
rates are higher in the construction sector than in any other sector. This reflects the
“structural crisis” from which this sector suﬀered during the period of observation.9
6The combined hazard ratio function is calculated by multiplying the hazard ratios of the linear and
the squared size term (from Table 2) for diﬀerent values of the untransformed number of employees.
Note that, together, the linear and squared term are significant, both for mergers and bankruptcies.
7Harhoﬀ et al. (1998) find for German data that the hazard function peaks around 18 employees.
8The largest firm in our sample has 6,134 employees.
9See, e.g., the Historical Dictionary of Switzerland (http://www.lexhist.ch). Figures published by
the Swiss National Bank (2003) indicate that the price index for apartments fell by more than 23% from
1994-1999; other real estate prices also showed considerable decreases. This is likely to have contributed
to high bankruptcy rates, as construction firms often use real estate as collateral to secure credits. A
drop in construction expenses of more than 15% from 1994-1999 underlines the problems in this sector.
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Interestingly, though, merger rates turn out to be lowest for the construction sector
(even though the coeﬃcient is not significant).
Region. Previous work by Kaiser (2004) and Buehler et al. (2004) has established
that aggregate exit rates in non-German-speaking areas are generally higher than in
German-speaking areas.10 Our estimation results for bankruptcy rates are in line with
this finding. The results for merger rates, however, are reversed: Merger rates are
significantly lower in non-German speaking areas, suggesting that there are important
diﬀerences in the principal drivers of bankruptcies and mergers.
Export orientation. Exporting firms tend to have lower bankruptcy rates than
non-exporting firms. More specifically, firms exporting up to a third or more than
two thirds of their output have significantly lower bankruptcy rates than non-exporting
firms.11 The picture is less clear for merger rates: None of the hazard ratios is found to
be significant, which suggests that a firm’s export orientation does have little impact on
merger rates.
Macroeconomic conditions. Another important diﬀerence concerns the impact
of a change in the growth rate of GDP. An increase in growth reduces the probability
of bankruptcy, but significantly increases the merger probability.12 This suggests that
mergers were not primarily undertaken to avoid business failure. The eﬀects of changes
in the Swiss currency’s external value and the number of previous bankruptcies on
bankruptcy and mergers hazards, however, are fairly similar.
<Figure 1 around here>
Summing up, the results from estimating (1) indicate that there are important dif-
ferences in the principal drivers of mergers and bankruptcies. In particular, we find that
while large firms are less likely to fail than small firms, they are more likely to merge. Fur-
thermore, there are considerable diﬀerences in the impact of other covariates–including
industry-specific characteristics and relevant macroeconomic conditions–on bankruptcy
and merger rates. Taken together, these results indicate that mergers are often under-
taken for reasons unrelated to business failure.
10Possible explanations for this finding include regional diﬀerences in industry composition, tax treat-
ment, unemployment, etc. Future research will examine the regional diﬀerences in exit rates in more
detail.
11Potential explanations include advantages of diversification into diﬀerent markets and a positive
selection of competitive firms operating in international markets.
12This result depends to some extent on the time span over which growth rates are calculated. We
chose a time span of two years to accommodate (long-term) growth eﬀects. We attempted to control
for (short-term) business cycle eﬀects using the number of bankruptcies in the previous year.
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3.2 The Eﬀect of Firm Age
In this section, we further explore how bankruptcy and merger rates change over a
firm’s lifetime. To do so, we use the same covariates as above to estimate a family of
models given by (2), making alternative assumptions on the probability distribution of
survival duration. More specifically, we employ the four commonly used distributions
summarized in Table 3:
<Table 3 around here>
Inspection of Table 3 indicates that the choice of the distribution to some extent
determines the shape of the hazard function. The Exponential distribution, for instance,
imposes a time-independent hazard rate, whereas the Weibull distribution may give rise
to either a monotone increasing or decreasing hazard function. The Log-normal and the
Log-logistic distribution, in turn, are able to give rise to hump-shaped hazard functions.13
We now consider the estimated hazard functions for bankruptcies and mergers for each
of these distributions (see Figures 2 and 3).14
First, consider the eﬀect of firm age on bankruptcy. Figure 2 indicates that the hazard
function is essentially decreasing in firm age: Apart from the Exponential model (where
the hazard is constant over time by assumption) and the Log-normal model (where an
early peak is reached after 9 quarters), estimated hazard functions decrease in firm age.
Note, in particular, that the hazard function of the Log-logistic model is monotonically
decreasing, even though, in principle, a hump-shaped function would be possible. In
terms of both the Log-likelihood and the Akaike information criterion, the Log-normal
model performs best, followed by the Log-logistic model.15
<Figure 2 around here>
Second, consider the eﬀect of firm age on merger. Inspection of Figure 3 shows that
the estimated hazard functions look similar to those for bankruptcies, even though the
peak of the hazard function from the Log-normal model is reached somewhat later (after
18 quarters). In terms of the Log-likelihood and the Akaike information criterion, we
get the same ordering as for bankruptcies, i.e., the Log-normal model performs best,
followed by the Log-logistic model.
In sum, we find that the hazard rates for both bankruptcies and mergers tend to
decrease with firm age. This is in line with previous literature, which suggests that exit
rates decrease with age (see, e.g. Mata and Portugal 1994 and Audretsch et al. 2000).
13See, e.g., Kiefer (1988) or Gouriéroux and Jasiak (2003) for a discussion of the properties of these
distributions functions.
14The regression results are available on request from the authors.
15Using the Schwarz criterion does not aﬀect the results.
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<Figure 3 around here>
At first sight, it might seem puzzling that a firm’s age does aﬀect the likelihood
of bankruptcy and merger in very similar ways, whereas the eﬀects of firm size on the
likelihood of bankruptcy and merger go in opposite directions. Note, however, that these
findings make sense intuitively: They suggest that a small old firm (that has not grown
in the past) is unlikely to seek external growth by merger; it is perfectly conceivable,
though, that this small old firm merges to avoid bankruptcy. Similarly, a small young
firm is unlikely to be ready for an expansive merger. Its decision to merge is more likely
to be driven by the wish to avoid early bankruptcy. In contrast, a large old firm (that
has grown in the past) tends to seek further external growth by merger. That is, large
firms appear to be more likely to undertake mergers to achieve external growth.
In summary, the crucial influence of size (and not age) combined with the possible
motive of external growth bymerger suggests that firms often merge for reasons unrelated
to business failure.
4 Conclusions
The empirical evidence reported in this paper demonstrates that there are important
diﬀerences in the principal drivers of mergers and bankruptcies. In particular, we find
that the standard prediction of the exit literature–large firms tend to have lower hazard
rates than small firms–is inappropriate for mergers. In fact, the opposite seems to be
true: Large firms are more likely to merge than small firms. A firm’s age, in turn,
aﬀects the likelihood of bankruptcy and merger in very similar ways: Both bankruptcy
and merger rates decrease with age. Taken together, these findings support the notion
that mergers are often undertaken to take advantage of opportunities for external growth.
More specifically, large firms are more likely to grow further by merger than small firms.
Old firms, in turn, tend to merge for the same reasons as they go bankrupt.
The notion that mergers are often undertaken to seize growth opportunities is sup-
ported by the other determinants of mergers and bankruptcies. More specifically, merger
rates tend to be particularly low in industries and regions where bankruptcy rates are
particularly high. Also, merger rates are found to increase with macroeconomic growth,
whereas bankruptcy rates decrease.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (source: SBC 95, DBED, SNB, own calculations)
Code Variable Contents Mean/Value Std. Dev./Share
Cardinal Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Survival
Duration Lifetime of the firm (quarters) censored/truncated
Size
Emp Number of employees 13.63 61.36
Macroeconomic conditions
GDP Growth Growth of GDP (1993-1998) 0.83 1.01
Ext Val Swiss Franc’s external value, index (1994-1999) 102.45 4.82
Bankrupt Number of bankruptcies (per quarter) 45.70 4.78
Categorical Variables Value Share (%)
Industry
Manufact Manufacturing Reference var. 18.36
Construct Construction 0(no), 1(yes) 12.10
Trade Trade 0(no), 1(yes) 29.63
Service Service 0(no), 1(yes) 39.90P
= 100
Regions
Eastern CH Eastern CH, Zürich Reference var. 34.11
and Graubünden
NW CH Northwestern CH 0(no), 1(yes) 23.82
and Bern
Central CH Central CH 0(no), 1(yes) 10.66
French CH French CH 0(no), 1(yes) 24.53
Ticino Ticino 0(no), 1(yes) 6.87P
= 100
Export Shares
Exposh 1 no export Reference var. 73.73
Exposh 2 < 13 0(no), 1(yes) 13.23
Exposh 3
£
1
3 ,
2
3
¤
0(no), 1(yes) 4.62
Exposh 4 > 23 0(no), 1(yes) 8.42P
= 100
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Table 2: Estimated hazard ratios (exp(bβj), j = 1, ..., p)
Covariates Bankruptcies Mergers
Size
LnEmp 1.1457∗∗∗ 1.5472∗∗∗
(0.0528) (0.1543)
(LnEmp)2 0.9376∗∗∗ 0.9758
(0.0110) (0.0176)
Industry
Construct 1.4095∗∗∗ 0.7663
(0.0835) (0.1367)
Trade 0.9033∗ 1.1907
(0.0471) (0.1515)
Services 0.7960∗∗∗ 1.0344
(0.0402) (0.1286)
Region
NW CH 1.1199∗∗ 0.8920
(0.0530) (0.0987)
Central CH 0.9541 1.0217
(0.0622) (0.1443)
French CH 1.3762∗∗∗ 0.5973∗∗∗
(0.0614) (0.0758)
Ticino 1.4152∗∗∗ 0.5928∗∗
(0.0939) (0.1280)
Export Orientation
Exposh 2 0.8168∗∗∗ 0.9732
(0.0470) (0.1238)
Exposh 3 1.0637 1.1190
(0.0865) (0.2188)
Exposh 4 0.8226∗∗∗ 1.1405
(0.0561) (0.1772)
––––––––––— Table continued on next page ––––––––––—
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Table 2: Estimated hazard ratios (continued)
Covariates Bankruptcies Mergers
Macroeconomic Conditions
GDP Growth 0.8942∗∗∗ 1.3779∗∗∗
(0.0262) (0.1001)
Ext Val 1.1371∗∗∗ 1.0834∗∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0325)
Bankrupt 1.0011∗∗∗ 1.0020∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0003)
Log-likelihood −31, 724.12 −4, 708.62
Number of Subjects 54, 750 54, 750
Number of Bankr./Mergers 3, 431 524
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
*,**,*** Coeﬃcients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Dummy Coding of Categorical Variables
Industry: Manufact (ref. var.), Construct, Trade, Services;
Region: Eastern CH (ref. var.), NW CH, Central CH, French CH, Ticino;
Export: Exposh 1 (ref. var.), Exposh 2, Exposh 3, Exposh 4.
Table 3: Parametric distributions of survival durations
Distribution Density Function Hazard Function Parameterization
Exponential f(t) = γ exp(−γt) h(t) = γ γ = exp(−xβ)
Weibull f(t) = γαtα−1 exp(−γtα) h(t) = γαtα−1 γ = exp(−xβ);α
Log-logistic f(t) = γαtα−1/(1 + tαγ)2 h(t) = γαtα−1/(1 + tαγ) γ = exp(−xβ);α
Log-normal f(t) = 1tσφ
¡
ln t−µ
σ
¢
h(t) = 1t
[1/σφ((ln t−µ)/σ)]
1−Φ((ln t−µ)/σ)) µ = exp(−xβ);σ
φ and Φ denote the standard normal density and distribution, respectively.
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Figure 2: Bankruptcy hazard as a function of firm age
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Figure 3: Merger hazard as a function of firm age
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